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Abstract
Electronic Health Data (EHD) is an emerging health information exchange model that facilitates healthcare
providers and patients to efficiently store and share their private healthcare information from any place and at
any time as per demand. Generally, Cloud services provide the infrastructure by reducing the cost of storing,
processing and updating information with improved efficiency and quality. However, the privacy of Electronic
Health Records (EHR) is a significant hurdle while outsourcing private health data in the cloud because there
is a higher peril of leaking health information to unauthorized parties. Several existing techniques are able to
analyse the security and privacy issues associated with e-healthcare services. These methods are designed for
single database, or databases, with an authentication centre and thus cannot adequately protect the data from
insider attacks. Therefore, this research study mainly focusses on how to ensure the patient privacy while
sharing the sensitive data between same or different organisations as well as healthcare providers in a cloud
environment. This paper proposes a multi-layer access control mechanism named MLAC Model to construct a
secure and privacy-preserving EHR system that enables patients to share their data with stakeholders. In this
paper, we use a Dual layer access control model named Pseudo-Role Attribute based access control (PR-ABAC)
mechanism that integrates attributes with roles for the secure sharing of EHR between multiple collaborators.
The proposed framework also uses the concept of Provenance to ensure the Integrity of patient data. This
work is expected to provide a foundation for developing security solutions against cyber-attacks, and thus
contribute to the robustness of healthcare information sharing environments.
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1. Introduction
EHD (also known as electronic health records or
computerised patient records) is a systematic collection
of electronic health information about individual
patients or populations [1]. Such records include a
whole range of data including demographics, medical
∗Corresponding author. Email: Shekha.chenthara@live.vu.edu.au
histories, medication and allergies, immunisation
status, laboratory test results, radiology images, billing
information and all sensitive patient information. EHD
systems have significant advantages over traditional
systems based on paper records. Unlike paper-based
records, EHR incur less manpower, time and physical
storage [2]. The advantages of EHRs include easier
access to clinical data, ability to maintain effective
clinical workflows, fewer medical errors, improved
patient safety, reduce medical costs, stronger support
for clinical decision-making, etc. Across Australia,
millions of healthcare documents are sent across
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the country. Over 90% of Australian medical service
providers have adopted EHD systems, as the value
of EHDs can provide vital information for medical
resource allocation, medical research, and improved
healthcare. According to a national survey : 94% of
providers reported that their EHR makes records
readily available at point of care, 88% reported that
their EHR produces clinical benefits for the practice,
75% of providers reported that their EHR allows
them to deliver better patient care [2]. However, the
transition from paper-based to EHR systems poses
some unique challenges for privacy and confidentiality,
security, data integrity and availability.
As Cloud computing is emerging as a new computing
paradigm in healthcare sector [3], it not only facilitates
the exchange of electronic medical records (EMR)
among healthcare providers or organisations, but
also acts as a medical record storage center. As the
health data is increasing day-by-day in the big data
epoch, cloud plays an important role for data storage
by providing virtually unlimited storage that can
be accessed over the Internet [4]. That facilitates
healthcare providers and patients to create, manage
and access healthcare information from any place
and at any time per demand. Cloud services provide
the infrastructure by reducing the cost of storing,
processing and updating information with improved
efficiency and quality. As computerised medical
records are integrated into one place, data can be
accessed from different places by different users and
this increases the risk of invasion of privacy. Since
most of the data are sensitive, strictly confidential
and stored on a third-party server where the owner
does not have direct access, entails serious threats in
terms of data privacy [5] and security [6]. Patient with
chronic conditions and associated sensitive information
need to be securely shared and accessed by healthcare
providers. This project will focus on identifying the
most appropriate method to share private information
between multiple healthcare providers in the patients’
care team and the patient and their family or carers in
the cloud environment.
Hence, EHRs in healthcare is facing problems with
privacy breaches and unauthenticated record access
in the recent years, the prime most one is related to
privacy [7] and security of medical data [6]. The issues
range from malware attacks that compromise the
integrity of systems and confidentiality of patients to
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) which can disrupt
facilities ability to provide patient care. In healthcare
systems, for instance, cyber-attacks like Ransomware
can have ramifications beyond financial loss and breach
of privacy [8]. Earlier this year, hackers broke into the
databases of Community Health Systems (CHS), one
of the largest hospital groups in the United States,
and accessed personal health information, name,
address and personal data including social security
numbers from around 4.5 million patients. Hackers
from Internet vigilante group Anonymous also targeted
several hospitals, launching a DDoS attack on the
hospital website as an act of hacktivism [9]. So, there is
an indispensable need to protect the privacy, security,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of protected
health information (PHI) in EHR [10]. In this context,
Cyber security is utmost required to prevent, detect,
and act on unauthorized access to health system and its
impact towards social, economic, political and cultural
conflicts. Therefore, the primary research question is
to strengthen the security infrastructure by providing
protection mechanism in e-health care [11] aiming
towards patients’ confidence and thereby providing
privacy [12] to EHD. The research work mainly focusses
on how to ensure the patient privacy while sharing
the data between same or different organisations as
well as healthcare providers in a cloud environment.
It emphasises on how we can access and transfer the
data efficiently in a cloud arena. The main research
questions include:
RQ1: What are the challenges and how to overcome
those while sharing the data between different
healthcare providers?
RQ2: How to implement privacy preserved healthcare
data storage?
RQ3: How to maintain Integrity of the Electronic
Health Data?
1.1. Individual Objectives
This research aims to build a multi-party framework
that effectively and securely stores, access and share
patient data between the different organisation
and healthcare providers while preserving patient
confidentiality. The overall aim of the research is
to develop a secure and efficient task-based multi-
party framework thereby strengthen the security
infrastructure in health care aiming towards patients’
confidence in e-health care and thus providing security
and privacy to EHD. It also points to strengthening the
data security to prevent a possible breach of data by
providing efficient Access Control Mechanisms for data
sharing on EHD database federations. To achieve the
overarching aim of the project the following individual
objectives are identified: The individual objectives
1. Initially, the research will focus on how appropriate
access control mechanisms can be applied to EHD for
ensuring the data privacy so that the system will be
immune to both inside and outside attacks. This will
also reduce the cost of managing access control to
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encrypted EHD and thus provide a practical solution to
data mining on encrypted EHD database federations;
our research will improve population health knowledge
to the benefit of Australians’ wellbeing.
2. Data is encrypted and stored in a third-party
system like Cloud. Since the data is stored in an
encrypted form, normal searching schemes cannot be
applied. We should have some ’searchable database’
implementation to query the data. Otherwise, either
the entire data should be downloaded to the local
system, decrypt and search OR decrypt in the cloud
system itself and search and retrieve only the required
files. The former approach results in high bandwidth
consumption and the latter results in a security
violation.
3. Up to what extent, the access control should be
implemented. In some cases, table level access control
is sufficient whereas, in others, access control should be
implemented to rows, columns and to each cell. E.g.,
an orthopaedic doctor needs to access only rows related
to orthopaedic data. An insurance person should have
access to the insurance related details and not to
medical records.
4. Focus to improve privacy protection against insider
attacks and to provide security in data storage. Our
research will be protecting patient data against both
outsider and insider attacks, which uses the concept
of provenance thereby, maintain the confidentiality
and integrity of the data. Our work will empower
medical research thereby this work will develop a
privacy-preserving Electronic Health Data federation
system.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
describes the contribution from academic and practical
view and section 3 describes an intensive analysis of
existing security and privacy preserving mechanisms.
Section 4 describes the methodology and conceptual
framework and section 5 as conclusion.
2. Contributions
Here we discuss the academic contribution and
practical contribution of this research towards privacy
preservation of healthcare records.
2.1. Contribution to Knowledge
The significance of the research is that it provides a
practical solution to privacy-preserving data mining
over EHD database federations, which will have
important and comprehensive impacts. In particular,
it will improve protection from insider attacks. As
existing solutions are very vulnerable to insider attacks
due to unauthorised access our research will provide
protection based on access control models, making
it impossible for medicare personnel along with
employees of other organisations to jointly breach the
system. The other significant factor is that it will
reduce the cost of managing access control to encrypted
EHDs. This will also empower medical research. The
main innovation of the research is twofold. One is,
joint authentication by a federation of organisations,
immune to insider attacks: we will develop an EHD
system with no authentication centre but a joint
authentication mechanism by t out of n parties; in
this way, individual parties, administrators do not
have access to the encrypted EHDs and effectively
block unauthorised access by insider attacks. Second
innovation is to develop an access control mechanism
for privacy protection of EHRs thereby securing data in
Healthcare Information system.
2.2. Statement of Significance
Privacy and security of Big Data is gaining prominence
nowadays due to its high proliferation and utility
as a result of recent developments in Information
and Communication Technology(ICT) such as social
networking, IoT (Internet of things) Big data analytics
and Cloud computing. Nowadays, cyber-attacks are on
the rise, and it affects more in the area of health care
sector at an alarming rate. Criminals and cyber threat
actors often look to exploit the vulnerabilities that are
associated with life-critical services that are aimed to
improve the treatment and patient care, especially, with
new technologies. These issues range from malware
attacks that compromises the integrity of systems and
privacy of patients to distributed denial of service
(DDoS) which can disrupt facilities’ ability to provide
patient care. In healthcare systems, for instance,
cyber-attacks like Ransomwares can have ramifications
beyond financial loss and breach of privacy. In this
context, the current project focuses on protecting the
privacy of patients by strengthening security to prevent
possible breach of data. The proposed work will build
a system that effectively and securely share confidential
patient data among several organisations that protects
the data from both outsider and insider attacks. The
main significance of the research is that it provides
a practical solution to privacy-preserving data sharing
over EHD database federations that could lead to
improved comprehensiveness, coordination, efficiency,
effectiveness, value of care, as well as the satisfaction
of patients and providers. This work focusses on
providing patient-centred care and primary care
meeting important needs of patients, service providers
and General Practitioners (GPs). This will also ensure
excellent patient care and privacy i.e. paramount for
healthcare organisations, including hospitals, medical
centres, independent physicians’ groups and insurance
providers. Another main aspect is that protection of
EHD that is stored in third party cloud can be achieved
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Figure 1. Taxonomy of the privacy preserving approaches in thee-Health cloud
by ensuring privacy and security, and this will in turn
enhance the overall welfare of patients and population.
3. Literature Review
EHDs, also known as electronic or computerised
patient records, refer to a whole range of data including
demographics, medical histories, medication and
allergies, immunisation status, laboratory test results,
radiology images and billing information [1]. As most of
this EHD contain sensitive data, data breach is a major
concern. Therefore, in order to protect the confidential
data from possible data breaches, strict privacy
preserving mechanisms have to be employed. To
protect the privacy of patient data, access control [13]
mechanisms and encryption techniques are being
used nowadays. Taxonomy of the privacy preserving
approaches in the e-Health cloud is portrayed in Fig. 1
There are several research investigations conducted
in my study area by leading scientists, and the
prominent ones that are reported in the literature, for
instance, by Xun Yi et al. This work provides a solution
to protect the privacy of patient data under multiparty
framework where all EHRs are encrypted with common
public key and an encrypted EHR can be decrypted
only by the cooperation of all parties. This solution
is built on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based on
EIGamal Threshold public key encryption scheme [1].
This scheme uses modular exponentiation which is
less expensive and re-encryption is not required. This
prevents any server and collusion of up to N-1 servers
and therefore can succeed from inside attack and
outside attacks. This scheme achieves n server joint
authentication over only one database. Attribute-based
encryption (ABE)presented by Sahai et al [14] is a
cryptographic primitive based on the Public Key
Encryption where the messages can be encrypted
and decrypted on the basis of user attributes. In
this, a cipher text can be decrypted only when the
attributes and the decryption keys [15]are available.
It is a public key encryption in which Secret key of the
user and Cipher text are dependent upon attributes.
Decryption of cipher text is possible if the attributes of
CT matches with attributes of secret key. In KP-ABE,
using the master key, owner encrypts the data such
that a cipher text is labelled with a set of attributes.
In KP-ABE, keys associated with the access structure
should be equal to the user’s secret key for decryption.
In cipher text-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-
ABE) a user’s private-key is associated with a set
of attributes and a cipher text specifies an access
policy over a defined universe of attributes within the
system. In CP-ABE, Cipher text will have the access
structure embedded in it and users can have their
attributes saved in their secret keys. Multiauthority
attribute-based encryption (MA-ABE) allows the users
keys to be collectively generated by multiple trusted
authorities that are responsible for governing the
subsets of the users attributes. Broadcast cipher text-
policy attribute-based encryption (bABE) is effective
in direct revocation of the user keys without the need
of refreshing system parameters or data encryption.
bABE ensures the health data confidentiality, but it
causes increased computational overheads in enforcing
the access policies [6]. Yu et al [16] addressed the issues
of concurrently achieving the fine-grained access,
scalability and confidentiality of the outsourced data.
Here the data encrypted by a single user is shared
with multiple users by distributing the keys. In the
proposed approach the tasks of re-encrypting the data
files and updating of the secret keys are delegated
to the cloud servers [17]. To deal with the heavy
computation overheads caused by re-encryption of data
files and update of secret key, the KP-ABE, PRE and
lazy reencryption are combined.
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Narayan et al [18] proposed an attribute-based
infrastructure for the EHR where the patients encrypt
their EHR files using the bABE. This approach solves
the key management issues by using the users attribute
for data encryption allowing every user to have only
one private key for their attribute set for decryption.
This approach also allows users to carry and healthcare
providers to perform keyword-based searches on the
encrypted patients’ records without revealing the
keywords or partial matches to the cloud system. The
keyword search functionality is provided by combining
the bABE and the Public-Key Encryption with Keyword
Search (PEKS). Ibraimi et al [19] proposed a multi-
authority scheme for protecting EHD across different
domains. The limitation of the work is that they are
not designed for database federations of many medical
organisations. Li et al [20] used ABE to manage access
control [21] over the health data in multi-owner,
multi-authority and multiuser cloud environment.
The study was performed in which patients are
capable of setting their own preferences, generating the
decryption keys using the MA-ABE and distributing
keys to the authorized users. The proposed scheme
is claimed to be flexible in supporting efficient and
on-demand revocation of user access rights and also
suffers from excessive computational overhead at the
data owner side. To encrypt the patient health record,
ABE can be used. The disadvantage is that it is unable
to handle the situations where data access rights are
granted based on the users’ identities instead of the
attributes [22]. From this discussion it is succinct that
the non-cryptographic approaches can never be truly
secure in public clouds because they are susceptible
to information disclosure by some insiders or other
hackers. This can be applicable only in private clouds
to a desired level because the infrastructure in such
cases is trusted [6].
Narayan [18]proposed a patient centric cloud
based EHR system by incorporating symmetric key
cryptography, public key cryptography and an attribute
based architecture. This method includes encrypting
the patient health data being encrypted by the patient
using a symmetric key and also a metadata file which
includes description of the file, attribute based access
policy, location information encrypted using broadcast
CP-ABE and stored in a cloud platform. This method
supports direct revocation without re-encryption of
data but has a higher computational cost on patient
end where all re-encryption and updating of access
policies are handled by the patient side [18]. Another
downside is that the Trusted Authority can access all the
encrypted files. Barua et al [23] used the mechanisms
of proxy re-encryption and ABE to develop a more
sophisticated cloud based solution. However it does not
required external party for key distribution, it leads to a
single point of failure and also creates key escrow while
managing all attributes with a single authority. In order
to resolve the issue Li et al [24] introduced a cloud
based health record sharing scheme using both KP-ABE
and MA-ABE schemes. This solution exerts some level
of computational cost on the user side. Comparison
of privacy preserving cryptographic approaches and
non-cryptographic approaches is portrayed in Table I
and II respectively.
In Table I and II, X, 7 symbols represent whether
a particular privacy-preserving requirement is fulfilled
or not, and - represents that a particular requirement
is not discussed. The Abbreviations such as IN-
Integrity, CO - Confidentiality, AU - Authenticity, NR-
Nonrepudiation, AC - Accountability , AN - Anonymity,
UN - Unlinkability. In EHR systems as most of the
data are strictly confidential and stored in a third
party cloud, Access control mechanisms are equally
ineludible and vital as Encryption techniques. Access
control is a fundamental security barrier for data
privacy in a healthcare information [13] system which
limits who can access and operate the documents in
an EHR system. Harsha et al [25] proposed a patient-
centric attribute based scheme in which each PHR
(personal health record) file is encrypted and stored
in a healthcare cloud along with an attribute based
access policy which controls the access to encrypted
resource and also utilizes a proxy re-encryption scheme
to facilitate the authorized users to decrypt the required
PHR files. This scheme is resistant against attacks
mounted via attribute collusion as well as capable
of provisioning on-demand user revocation. Suhair
and Rajendra [26] presented a framework which
eliminates the limitations of RBAC (Role based access
control) and ABAC( Attribute-Based Access Control).
This work proposed a BiLayer Access control(BLAC)
to integrate attributes with roles in which an access
request is checked against pseudoroles before checking
the rules within the policy. R.Sandhu et al [27] [28]
proposed RBAC [29] in which subjects are assigned
to roles and roles are associated with permissions
that defines which operations can be performed over
which objects. This scheme has several drawbacks
of expensive process to define and structure roles,
supports only predefined and static policies, cannot
support dynamically changing environments [30],
and also RBAC’s coarse-granularity causes inside
attacks [31] . Yuan and Tong [32] proposed ABAC
in which each subject’s specific attributes are used
to define access policies for access permission. ABAC
resolves issues of RBAC but it has two problems. First,
ABAC is complex due large number of rules that needed
to be checked for access decisions and secondly for n
attributes ABAC may require 2n possible rules [30].
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Table 1. Comparison of Privacy Preserving Cryptographic Approaches
Sl No. Technique(s) Strength Weakness Privacy Requirements Ref.
IN CO AU NR AC AN UN
1
KP-ABE, PRE, Lazy
Re-encryption
Scalable
access
control
Computa-
tional
overhead
at server
7 X - 7 X - - [10]
2
bABE. PKE with
keyword search
Efficient
revocation
Inflexible
access
control
7 X 7 X 7 - - [11]
3 ABE
Hides the
identities
of data
storing
entities
Cloud is
aware of
access
policy
about each
record
7 7 X 7 X X - [9]
4 MA-ABE
Scalable
access
control
Manage-
ment
overhead
7 X X 7 7 7 7 [5]
5 SKE
Solves key
distribu-
tion
among
multiple
users
Difficult to
manage
multiple
user roles
X X X - 7 - - [5]
6
Threshold
cryptography
Stored
crypto key
tables not
required
Existence
of trusted
authority
7 X 7 X - - - [5]
7 Broadcast ABE
Direct
revocation
capability
TA can
access all
encrypted
files
7 X 7 X - - - [5]
8 IBE, ABE
Resistant
against
collusion
and eaves-
dropping
Care
provider
encrypts
the data
according
to the
access tree
X X 7 7 - - - [13]
9 MA-ABE, KP-ABE
Flexible
access with
private
and public
domains,
Eliminate
single
point of
failure
User must
obtain one
attribute
from each
authority
7 X 7 X - - - [14]
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Table 2. Comparison of Privacy Preserving Non-Cryptographic Mechanisms
Sl No. Technique(s) Strength Weakness Privacy Requirements Ref.
IN CO AU NR AC AN UN
1 RBAC
Simpler
access
adminis-
tration
Expensive
process to
define
roles
7 7 7 7 7 - - [18]
2 ABAC
Dynamic
access
control
policy
Requires
large no: of
rules
7 X X X X - - [22]
3 BLAC
Combines
advantages
of RBAC
and ABAC
Security
threats 7 X X X X - - [17]
4
Policy based
authorization
Selective
sharing of
health data
Lack of
confiden-
tiality
7 7 7 7 7 - - [5]
Figure 2. Overview of MLAC Model
4. Methodology and Conceptual Framework
This work proposes a multi-layer access control
mechanism, MLAC Model to construct a secure and
privacy-preserving EHR system that enables patients
to share their data among stakeholders in a cloud
environment. This framework proposes a novel access
control mechanism for preserving the privacy of EHRs,
which incorporates integrity and privacy issues to make
access control decisions in the cloud environment.
We propose a novel Pseudo-Role Attribute based
access control mechanism (PR-ABAC) which is a multi-
layer mechanism that combines the advantages of both
Role based access control (RBAC) mechanism[24] and
Attribute based access control (ABAC) [28]. This
multi-layer access control model being proposed inte-
grate attributes with roles combining the advantages
of RBAC and ABAC and also uses the concept of
provenance thereby aims at assuring two fundamental
security properties confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive data in the healthcare domain.
4.1. An overview of MLAC Model
The proposed MLAC model uses the concept of
pseudorole, which is defined as a set of static attributes
of subjects (users). A pseudorole can be defined as a job
function. Subjects’ attributes are categorized as static
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(when attributes values typically do not change) such
as Name, ID, Gender, Provider, Department, Location
and dynamic (when attribute values change frequently)
such as age etc. This model uses static attributes to
generate the pseudoroles, and static as well as dynamic
attributes are used in policies to constrain pseudoroles.
Fig. 2 presents an overview of the PR-ABAC model.
In PR-ABAC, subjects are associated with
pseudoroles, which includes a set of static attributes
and objects are associated with policies, which specify
how attributes are considered for access requests. When
an access request is made, the policy associated with the
requested object is first checked with the Provenance
database to see whether the corresponding data is
available to grant access according to Provenance rules
and if not, it checks with the (first layer) to see whether
the requester has the required pseudorole or not. If so,
rules within the policies are then checked for additional
fine-grained constraints (second layer) to approve or
deny the access request. Initially, the policy will check
whether the subject requesting access to an object holds
the needed Provenance rules to grant or deny access.
Then the policy associated with the requested object
checks to see whether the requester has the required
pseudorole or not . If so, next each rule is checked
to see if the access conforms to the specified values
for subject, object, action and environment attributes,
otherwise access is denied. This three-step process
inspires the name Multi-Layer access control policy
which permits fine-grained decisions. This work will
demonstrate the applicability of PR-RBAC model to
healthcare information sharing environments.
MLAC model is formally described using the tuple:
M = (S, O, E, A, PR, P, SPR, OP), Where S is a set of
subjects(users) with a predefined set of attributes in
which SATT could be provider, department, location
etc, O is a set of objects that are accessed by subjects
with a set of attributes OATT that could be patient
name, medical record number, E is the environment
with a predefined set of attributes EATT could be
access time, system mode. A is a set of actions with a
predefined set of attributes AATT could be read, write,
modify etc. PR is a set of pseudoroles that are composed
of n attributes that is described in section 4.2. P is a set
of policies for fine-grained access control consists of
two elements: a Boolean function named Pseudorole,
Provenance rule and a set of zero or more rules. A
policy structure is shown in Fig. 3, and components
of the MLAC model is shown in Fig. 4. SPR is the
subject-pseudorole assignment that is a one-to-many
mapping from pseudoroles to subjects and OP is the
object-policy assignment relation that is a one-to-many
mapping from policies to objects. A General Algorithm
for the MLAC model is described in Fig. 5.
Figure 3. Policy Structure
Figure 4. Components of MLAC Model
4.2. Algorithm for the Management of AccessControl
This algorithm shows the ability of our MLAC model
to precisely define the customized policies for the
management of Access Control that uses this model.
The algorithm shown in Fig. 5 allows or denies access to
an object on the basis of the inputs that it receives. The
possible inputs are Object identifier (object id) i.e. the
identifier of the clinical document in the EHR system,
to which access is required, user identifier (subject id)
is the identifier of the subject who requires to operate
on the object, role indicates the role associated with
the user in the EHR system, Operation is the action
required on the object and access mode is the mode
of access such as normal and emergency mode. The
output of the algorithm is PERMIT only if all the access
conditions are satisfied.
Each user (clinician) is associated with a private key
Sk and a common public key PK associated with the
cloud server. The steps are as follows.
•Access Req (AReq): Takes as Input the identity of
clinician Cid, the XACML query as the access structure
specifying the finer attributes (T), common public key
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Table 3. Subject’s Attributes
Name ID Gender Provider Department Location
E. Robert 345-765 Female Physician OB/GYN A
A. Mark 526-874 Male Physician OB/GYN A
H. John 231-938 Female Nurse OB/GYN A
M. Martin 657-923 Female Administrative Staff OB/GYN B
D. Lee 102-581 Male Administrative Staff Billing B
J. Fox 437-348 Male Physician PCP B
Figure 5. Algorithm for Access Control
Pk, Private key Sk of the clinician, which outputs the
access request, AReq= Areq(Cid, (T,Pk),Sk)
•Access Response (ARes): Takes as input the access
request AReq, the database D, public key of clinician
Pk, Access Structure T, Ares= Ares (AReq, D,(Pk,T))
•Response Retrieval (RRet): Takes as input the access
response Ares and private key Sk of clinician and
outputs associated EHR, R=RRet (Ares,Sk)
4.3. Pseudorole Generation
In PR-ABAC, pseudoroles will be generated from static
attributes [33] of subjects. Here we use the values of
the attributes associated with all subjects to generate
pseudoroles. Table 3 shows the Subjects’ Attributes
and Fig. 4 shows how corresponding pseudoroles will
be generated. Depending on the number of attributes
used for generating pseudoroles, a tree based structure
is used to identify the number of pseudoroles. If n
Figure 6. Pseudorole generation in MLAC Model
attributes are used to generate pseudoroles, m1 x m2
x m3 x . . . x mn is the total number of generated
pseudoroles where mn is the number of total different
values for attribute n. However, the meaningful
pseudoroles is a subset of these pseudoroles. Example
in Table 3 used three attributes (Provider, Department,
Location) as static subject attributes that generates 18
distinct pseudoroles as shown in Fig. 6.
To preserve the privacy of patient records, a few
access control rules are defined in this use case as
follow: Health records are split into three sections: (1)
demographic, (2) clinical, and (3) billing.
1) Subjects are not allowed to delete records in any
section 2) Physicians and nurses are allowed to read
and modify records within demographic and clinical
sections for patients who are under their responsibility
in normal and emergency situations 3) Physicians and
nurses are allowed to read and modify records within
demographic and clinical sections for non-patients
in emergency situations 4) Adminisitrative staff are
allowed to grant access to authorized users 5) Billing
staff are allowed to read and modify records within
billing section
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Figure 7. Policy within Clinical Section
The five meaningful pseudoroles used here are(1)
Physician OB/GYN A, (2) Physician PCP B, (3) Nurse
OB/GYN A, (4) Administrative Staff OB/GYN B (5)
Adminsitrative Staff PCP B. we have to define some
access control rules according to the requirement of the
organisation to preserve the privacy of health records.
4.4. Development of Access Policies
To preserve the privacy of patient records, access
control rules are defined. Based on the rules and the
structure of health records, some access policies are
defined. To enforce the access rules, we can create access
policy accordingly such as health records within the
clinical section, health record within clinical section
associated to psychiatric data with separate access
policy, health records within the demographic section
are associated with another policy, billing section with
another policy and so on according to the requirement
of organisation. An example of an access policy within
the clinical section is given in Fig. 7.
4.5. Implementation and Evaluation
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we
develop a secure EHR sharing system in cloud
environment based on our design discussed in figure
6. The core EHRs aggregation and sharing logic
will be implemented using ASP.NET framework using
Csharp programming technologies. This framework is
supported with an implementation using extensible
access control markup language(XACML) for deploying
access control policies. Here we use MySQL server as
database server.
A Authentication
Authentication between healthcare providers and EHR
sharing cloud is achieved through a PKI ( Public Key
Infrastructure) managed by EHR cloud application.
Each communication between them is signed with
sender’s private key so that the receiver can verify
the signature. Any request from an unregistered party,
not participating in the EHR sharing cloud, trying
to communicate with a healthcare provider will be
rejected.
B Authorization and Access Control
Authorization and Access Control are enforced by
giving the requesting healthcare providers access
to only the EHR information requested. This work
uses RBAC and ABAC access control paradigm for
authorization.
C Confidentiality
This framework is planning to use a symmetric key
encryption by means of a symmetric key to encrypt and
decrypt patients’ shared EHR information to preserve
confidentiality. The requesting healthcare provider will
generate the symmetric key.
D Integrity
Integrity will be achieved by using ’Data Provenance’.
E Privacy Analysis
For the EHR database D, we say that our access control
preserves data privacy of each EHR in D is accessible to
authorized clinicians only. Our access control protocols
and SQL preserve data privacy for the EHR Database D.
4.6. Evaluation
In this work, we are planning to evaluate the
performance of our framework in terms of System Time
Overhead, Number of Pseudoroles to generate, Number
of policies required for efficient electronic health record
access, Computational complexity and cost required for
the implementation.
5. Conclusion
Data Privacy and Security are facing innumerable
challenges nowadays due to recent advances in
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) viz
Social networking, IoT (Internet of Things), Big Data
analytics, Cloud Computing etc. The breach of data in
Healthcare is more critical since it compromises the
privacy and security of individuals at stake. Hence there
is an imminent need to protect the EHR against security
breaches by strengthening the security infrastructure
in healthcare to ensure the patient confidentiality.
This research develops a secure and flexible multi-
layer framework based EHR sharing scheme in a cloud
environment which satisfies the intended privacy and
integrity requirements. To ensure patient centric EHR
sharing, it is important to achieve fine-grained access,
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our scheme uses a multi-layer access control mechanism
which facilitates the EHR users to transfer and share the
resources effectively. In addition, the proposed scheme
introduces the concept of Provenance to ensure Data
Integrity.
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